Contemporary Politics of Climate Change: Ecological Modernization in Singapore

Rebecca SE Tan

28 November 2022

Introduction

Part of the C40 cities, Singapore is a unique case study due to its status as a city-state – granting it benefits such as greater control over policies and long-term financial planning (C40, n.d.). The most comprehensive climate change action plan to date is the 2030 Singapore Green Plan (SGP2030) (SGP, n.d.), which notably sets out to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 (Fig. 1) (NCCS, 2019). While Singapore’s environmental progress has indeed been impressive, it also very much embodies the ecological modernisation theory (Ho et al., 2013): the idea that market capitalism, technological advancement, and scientific management will help resolve the climate crisis (Fischer, 2009; Spaargaren & Mol, 2009). Indeed, Singapore’s path to sustainability is very much influenced by developmental goals, heavily reliant on technology, and may not sufficiently encourage public participation. In the long run, Singapore’s plans may hence be insufficient in addressing the root problem of consumerism, and in garnering local support and a mindset shift.

Figure 1. Goals of SGP 2030 (NCCS, 2019).

Predominance of Developmental Outputs

As with other countries with state dominance over executive institutions and experts, the Singapore government has been able to produce rapid and astounding policy outputs (Gilley, 2012; Sowers, 2007). Some argue that replicating this top-down, expert-driven approach will allow Singapore to reproduce its success in environmental sustainability, as it has in economic management (Shearman & Smith, 2007).

Indeed, the Singapore government is very proud of its sustainable achievements, attributing it to its long-term planning (CIRSD, 2019). Singapore is reputed to be “one of the greenest urban centres in Asia”, ranking first in Asia by the Economist Intelligence Unit (Barnard & Heng, 2014; Eco-Business, 2011). However, delving into the specifics of these sustainable measures reveals Singapore’s utilitarian view of nature, with a lopsided focus on environmental projects with economic benefits (Han, 2016). Such a high priority of development is also influenced by the perennial survivalist narratives in Singaporean politics, emphasising our small size and vulnerability (Goh, 2001). Further, the Singapore curriculum also promotes the city-state’s utilitarian view of nature, and the exigency to efficiently allocate Singapore’s limited resources for economic interests (Kwan & Stimpson, 2003). Hence, despite the amazing policy outputs in certain areas, any irresolvable conflicts between economic development and environmental projects will still result in a clear winner (Neo, 2007). This claim is elucidated through an analysis of two case studies – the city’s plan to reduce transportation emissions and expand green spaces.

i. “Green” Goal: Reducing Transport Emissions

The 2030 goal for 75% of commuters to use public transport during peak hour is a great way to reduce transport emissions (MOT, n.d.). However, the way in which the city sets out to achieve this aim demonstrates the predominant approach of infrastructural development. One strategy is to expand the public transport network system with the Cross Island Line (CIL).This proposal was highly controversial because it would cut across the Central Catchment Nature Reserve (CCNR), one of the few remaining patches of forests in Singapore (Koay & Zheng, 2019). Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) such as Nature Society Singapore warned that the construction will likely result in the clearing of 1.5ha of forested land, as well as other vast impacts such as the compaction of soil, toxic spillage, and erosion (NSS, 2013). The government then conducted two environmental impact assessments, but still eventually ruled for the CIL to be built directly under the nature reserve, rather than skirting around it (TODAY, 2019). While there are certainly great cost factors involved in this decision, this case study elucidates how only focusing on one aspect of sustainability (transport emissions) may shroud other important objectives such as conserving biodiversity (NParks, n.d.-a)

ii. “Green” goal: Expansion of Green Spaces

Expansion of green spaces, such as developing more than 130ha of new parks, or planting 170,000 more trees in industrial estates is a great way to incorporate nature in cities (NParks, n.d.-b). Singapore has, and will continue to do well in this respect – from 1975 to 2014, reserved area for parks and green spaces increased tenfold (NParks, n.d.-a). Yet, while artificial green spaces have indeed been expanding, native habitats are simultaneously being cleared for developmental projects – with examples such as the CCNR or the Dover Forest (Tan & Ng, 2021). The greenery in Singapore is neither natural nor spontaneous (Barnard & Heng, 2014), but rather a “human construct” that is vastly different from its native habitats (Neo, 2007). These “green” targets, such as ensuring every household is less than 10 minutes away from a park, may merely be capitalising on the instrumental value of nature (Goh, 2014) – to improve Singaporean morale and construct a more amenable environment for an economically productive workforce (Lee, 2000; Savage, 1998). Indeed, a study in 1999 found that Singaporeans felt "little affinity with nature" and were familiar with it "only in the form of parks and gardens" (Han, 2016). Through state-directed utilitarian discourse, Singaporeans have accepted the use of nature to advance pragmatic aims (Goh, 2014).

These two case studies elucidate Singapore’s "pragmatic" view of nature (Neo, 2007), employing a scientific and managerial approach that does not truly prioritise sustainability (Ooi, 2002). Rather, green aspects are simply emphasised when it falls in line with, or can be negotiated along other developmental goals. Singapore’s disproportionate focus on green infrastructure or materially relevant areas is seen across the board, with stellar achievements in areas such as water treatment and resources, adaptation to sea level rise, and becoming a green finance centre for Asia (Chua, 2014; NCCS, 2019). Comparatively, Singapore ranks terribly for “non-utilitarian” areas such as the protection of natural habitats (Chua, 2014). Thus, while it is not that development cannot go hand-in-hand with sustainability, Singapore has pushed forward a version of modernisation that limits environmental goals to that which can be reconciled with economic development goals (Wong, 2012).

Counting on Technology to Save the Day

Singapore is heavily reliant on the use of technology to solve climate issues, reflecting its technocratic, centralised bureaucracy (Barnard, 2014). While increasing efficiency can decrease emissions, this strategy does not address the root cause of consumption and may even serve to justify it.

One prominent example is Singapore’s plan to green the energy sector – of particular importance because it dominates its emissions (CAT, 2020). To “solve” this, Singapore is heavily investing in researching the best-in-class generation technology for energy and carbon efficiency (SGP, n.d.), and has even raised grant support for companies to develop energy-efficient technologies (NEA, 2022). Other examples include investing an additional $64 million into finding urban sustainability solutions, $45 million to support test-bedding green building technologies and another $220 million into resource circularity and water technologies (NCCS, 2019; NRF, n.d.).

While such technological advancement is very impressive, these efforts do not address the root cause of consumption and are hence insufficient to even compensate for the increase in energy demand (CAT, 2020). Climate Action Tracker has deemed Singapore’s policies and actions highly insufficient to reach the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement – if all countries followed Singapore’s approach, warming is predicted to increase by 3-4°C (CAT, 2020).

Insufficient Public Participation in Sustainability Efforts

Lastly, the strong central decision-making in Singapore limits public participation, such as green activists and organisations (Doyle & Simpson, 2006). Singapore also employs control mechanisms such as out-of-bound markers and the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, which may reduce civil society participation and advocacy (Ortmann, 2012).

One case study is the Senoko debacle. Senoko was a nesting site for over 180 species of birds, including 21 endangered species (Neo, 2007). Despite an appeal and mobilisation of approximately 25000 members of the public, the city-state still bulldozed Senoko for 17,000 housing units, illustrating its ability to override public opposition to its development policies (Chan & Saidul, 2015).

Fortunately, with a greater public call for more consultative governance, Singapore has introduced wider incorporation of public opinions and feedback mechanisms (Saxena, 2011). For example, the government has engaged over 1700 stakeholders and members of the public for SGP 2030, even including an Eco-fund to reward co-created green community solutions (NCCS, 2019). Other strategies include mobilising people through environmental campaigns and incorporating some policy recommendations by ENGOs (Ho et al., 2013).

Still, critics argue that such environmental participation is symbolic and gestural (Lee, 2005), and is being used as a way to promote nationalistic values in its citizenry (Teo, 2004). The city-state employs a co-optation strategy (Rodan, 2003), promoting certain groups insofar as they are aligned with the existing power structures (Doyle & Simpson, 2006), and frame their environmental agendas in terms of economic development (Barnard & Heng, 2014). As such, the city-state is able to maintain its power and define development needs (Neo, 2007; Rodan, 2003). Beyond this sphere, any conservation demands by civil society is dismissed as irrational and emotional (Neo, 2007).

In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to move away from the dominant utilitarian narrative. Instead, Singapore needs to encourage active public participation to truly achieve all-rounded sustainable policies, rather than merely those with developmental or technological outputs. Buy-in by the public also helps to signal societal change and grants governments more support in implementing greener policies.

Conclusion

I end off with this quote by Kate Yeo, an environmental activist in Singapore: “Idealistic is thinking that you can conquer Mother Nature with metal; idealistic is thinking you can bend the rules of nature for your economic quest.” Indeed, we must abandon the notion of ecological modernisation, and stop waiting for development and technology to save us. Instead, Singapore needs to engage the public to create a ripple of change; to move away from a consumerist mindset into one that is truly sustainable for everyone, and for all generations to come.

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