Defining Terrorism: A Power Play?

Rebecca SE Tan

5 October 2022

You would think that terrorism would be an easy concept to define. When we think of terrorism, we associate the term with attacks like 9/11 or groups like Al Qaeda. What could be so difficult to define? Yet, despite multiple attempts to conceptualise what “terrorism” entails, no conclusive definition has been accepted internationally. While there are elements that most agree upon (violence used to incite fear; the presence of a political agenda or ideology), there exist two major contentions in the definition of terrorism – the inclusion or exemption of state terrorism and national liberation. I contend that this failure of definition stems fundamentally from power plays and the differing interests of various nation-states.

Contention 1: Can a State be a Terrorist?

With coercion being a running theme in terrorism, the question arises: does the state reserve the right to inflict terror for deterrence?

On the one hand, some countries argue that, just as a responsible parent would, the state reserves the authority to intimidate, as it has already done with death penalties or its ability to wage wars (Cooper, 2001). With this Leviathan logic, a state can never be a terrorist – violent suppression is a necessary evil to quell the challenges to its civilising process (Hobbes, 1651). Such a view absolves leaders such as Kim Jong Un while also negating American interference in Iran or that of France in Mali.

On the other hand, other countries argue that an acceptance of this argument would mean that the definition of terrorism is not so much about the concrete action performed but rather a subjective judgement based on who the actor is and to whom they are performing the action against (Cooper, 2001). This subjective classification is deemed problematic due to the possibility of abuse depending on the agenda of the definition maker. In the 1970s, the Non-Aligned Group vociferously argued that state terrorism was, in fact, the worst form of terrorism, specifically targeting colonial and racist regimes (MEA, 2012). While spearheaded by Algeria, this notion was supported by many Arab and African countries, as well as a small number of western states such as Germany (Friedrichs, 2006).

However, this reasoning was shot down by many other western states, who insisted that other provisions already exist to restrain state violence, citing the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention (Friedrichs, 2006). Italy also purported that state terrorism should instead be dealt with using the rubrics of human rights. I, for one, am personally in favour of exempting state terrorism. While I am perfectly aware of a state's capability of performing devastating terroristic acts, I find that the broad inclusion of topics renders it more difficult to inform precise policy decisions to counter terrorism.

Either way, while this first contention was a significant sticking point in the 1970s, its controversy later died down in the 2000s (Friedrichs, 2006). By then, Arab countries had become more willing to concede the exemption of state terrorism insofar as national liberation was also exempted - the second and perhaps more presently debated topic in defining terrorism (OHCHR, 2008).

Contention 2: Is National Liberation Considered Terrorism?

“One man’s terrorist may be another’s freedom fighter.” This simple but provocative statement opens a whole can of worms – does the underlying cause matter?

The first camp, held by much of the West, argues that it does not – as long as terroristic means are employed, the purpose of the attacks is irrelevant (Cooper, 2001). Countries such as Germany (and the U.K. after the 2005 London attack) touted that the end could never justify the means – violence against the innocent should never be condoned (Friedrichs, 2006). Similarly, the United States protested that, as with domestic legislation, the underlying causes of crime do not prevent penal laws against criminals. (It is important here to note the undercurrent of political agenda. If parties are exempted “in situations of foreign occupation”, the United States would be forced to respect sovereign equality and reduce its global influence.)

By contrast, the second camp fiercely insists that violence for national liberation should be excluded from the definition of terrorism. Again in the 1970s, the Non-Aligned Group, particularly states such as Algeria, Libya and Syria, were proactive voices of this charge. With a history of fighting against colonialism and oppression, and the backdrop of the violent actors in Palestine and Chechnya, it is no wonder that they argued for a distinction between “heinous terrorism” and that which was “political in origin and purpose” (Thorup, 2012). Similarly, in the 2000s, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) demanded the exemption of national liberation movements (Schmid, 2004). Many of these states were sympathisers with the challengers to the West, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Israel or the resistance to the apartheid regime in South Africa. Interestingly, Italy supported this distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters, while France also maintained the importance of resolving the underlying causes of violent acts (Friedrichs, 2006). This support, however, may also be influenced by Italy's interest in diplomatic prestige and France's interest in maintaining influence over its former Arab colonies.

Personally, I find it difficult to tag national liberation with the negative label of terrorism. After all, such a classification would place revolutionists such as de Gaulle or George Washington in the same basket as that of the Islamic State. Yet, there is much nuance to be had - would you classify Che Guevara as a revolutionary or a terrorist? Furthermore, "othering" is potentially subjective. Take, for example, how Myanmar vigilantes describe the Rohingya as foreign intruders or outsiders. Indeed, an exclusion of national liberation requires further thought on what this entails, without being affected by our personal political biases.

The True Reason Behind a Lack of Resolution: Power Plays

“The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”

Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political

The definition of terrorism is in itself a political game – the ability to label others as an enemy while justifying your own use of force. Countries even contest whether terrorism should be defined! Ultimately, the definitional debate is a power play – a struggle for and against hegemony.

The strong benefits from the lack of a concrete definition. In particular, the U.S. government gains from retaining the discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, who falls within this category. (See: U.S. State Department’s list of terrorists here). This power allows them to criticise and hold back against whoever is convenient (Cooper, 2001). In particular, under the justification of a “War against terrorism”, the U.S. has been projecting its power in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gulf region (Friedrichs, 2006). By stigmatising these opponents as terrorists, their “moral high ground” shields them from criticisms of sovereign interference.

Comparatively, it is precisely this lack of a definition that presents a danger to everyone else. Without a standard definition to check against, there is no insurance against the hegemonic power. Even allies of the U.S. may find themselves becoming mere vassals, or even an enemy, if they do not join the “coalition of the willing” (Friedrichs, 2006). Perhaps, then, it is in everyone’s interest to struggle against an excessive accommodation to a hegemonic power, which may become a bigger problem than the enemy of terrorism itself.

That said, a separate school of thought purports that a lack of definition is positive, as a universal definition would likely be dictated by the most influential actors, creating a danger of bias. Instead, efforts could be redoubled on the terroristic acts themselves. While excellent on paper, I question the practical implications of such an approach. How, then, do you decide what a terroristic act is or what the appropriate countermeasure should be? Eventually, the problem of who gets to define and shape discourse resurfaces.

Discussion

Do you think terrorism should be defined? If so, how would you define it? Has your definition of terrorism changed after reading this article? Let me know your thoughts below!

References

Cooper, H. H. A. (2001). Terrorism: The problem of definition revisited. American Behavioral Scientist, 44(6), 881–893. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027640121956575

Friedrichs, J. (2006). Defining the international public enemy: The political struggle behind the legal debate on international terrorism. Leiden Journal of International Law, 19(1), 69–91. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156505003183

Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. Ancient Wisdom Publicatio. (Original work published 1651)

MEA. (2012, August 22). History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement. Mea.gov.in. https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement

OHCHR. (2008). Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism Fact Sheet No. 32. In Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. ISSN 1014-5567. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf

Schmid, A. (2004). Terrorism -The Definitional Problem. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36(2). https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1400&context=jil

Schmitt, C. (1932). The Concept of the Political. University of Chicago Press. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Concept-Political-Expanded-Carl-Schmitt/dp/0226738922

Thorup, M. (2012). An intellectual history of terror: war, violence and the state. Routledge.

U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 5, 2022, from https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-and-state-sponsors-of-terrorism/