Management of Race and Religion: The Singapore Context

Rebecca SE Tan

Originally written on 12 April 2021

“We have no illusions about the depths of the religious fault lines in our society, and the harm that will befall us if we neglect to manage them.” (PM Lee Hsien Loong, 2019)

Introduction

Singapore’s management of race and religion must be considered in the context of Singapore’s key ideology of survival, which necessitates the avoidance of potentially polarising topics such as ethnicity. However, I argue that a more liberal approach should be considered to move past primordial definitions of race and religion and promote thoughtful discourse on ethnic matters.

Survival ideology

It is essential to understand Singapore’s survival mindset because it explains the government’s tight rein on ethnic policies. Survival is the fundamental ideology of Singapore, and it guides other key ideologies such as multiracialism, pragmatism, and meritocracy (Abdullah, 2017a). This survival ideology is born through the geopolitical and historical context of Singapore.

Singapore is a “Chinese nut in a Malay nutcracker” (Huxley, 1991) – it is a Chinese-dominated country in the Malay Archipelago, next to powerful and potentially hostile Malay-dominated countries like Malaysia and Indonesia (Lee, 1998). As a small country, Singapore’s economic and physical survival is also at the mercy of others. In such a risky context, domestic stability is vital for Singapore to survive.

Historical events also perpetuate the survival ideology. Singapore’s vulnerability has been exposed through Konfrontasi and the various racial riots, most prominently the Maria Hertogh riots and the 1964 racial riots (Bass, 1975; Chua, 2015; Clutterbuck, 1984). Racial tensions have also been used to attempt an overthrow of the government, as incited by the Angkatan Revolusi Tentara Islam Singapura in 1961 (Tong, 2007).

Given the possibility of race and religion being used as a catalyst for ethnic violence (Kuah-Pearce, 2009), it is no wonder that the government constantly reminds Singaporeans that we are “vulnerable” and just “a little red dot”. This warning steers Singaporeans away from controversial issues like race and religion that could cause internal division and threaten our survival (Geertz, 1963).

However, I argue that while we have achieved a multiracial[1] society, Singapore would do well to transition into a multicultural[2] one. This transition necessitates a more liberal approach to move past primordial definitions of race and religion and encourage discourse on these issues.

Primordial Definitions of Race and Religion

i) Relevance of Primordial Definitions

That said, I believe that the use of primordial definitions in some of the policies Singapore employs is justifiable and need not be “liberalised”. After all, it would be presumptuous to assume that race and religion do not affect our perceptions and ideals (Lockerbie, 2013). Using a primordial definition of race and religion can effectively categorise and mix different ethnic groups so that members of the public can rethink their stereotypes and biases (Choon et al., 2004). For example, the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) steers people of different races and religions to live together and regularly interact, which could help prevent the similarity bias from leading to ethnic enclaves. This policy is undoubtedly one reason why 70% of Singaporeans believe that people of different religions can be on friendly terms when living close by (Fig. 1) (IPS, 2019).

Figure 1. More than 70% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree when asked if people belonging to different religions cannot be on friendly terms when living close by (IPS, 2019).

In the same vein, I believe that the Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCCs) is an excellent policy that should be retained. The IRCCs organise interfaith dialogues for people of different religions to interact (MCCY, n.d.). Through these events, faith leaders socialise with one another, which normalises such cordial interactions (Mathews & Chiang, 2016). Hence, despite the reliance on the primordial definition of religion, the IRCCs help foster greater interreligious understanding and harmony. As one of the world’s most religiously diverse nations (Pew Research Center, 2014), such interreligious harmony is crucial for our stability.

In both of these policies, the primordial definition of race and religion aims to encourage interactions and bond-building between people of different ethnicities. Hence, I believe these policies continue to be extremely useful to illuminate the culture and traditions of different ethnicities, clear up stereotypes, and erase the boundaries between different races and religions.

ii) Over-emphasis on Primordial Definitions in Choosing our Leaders

However, particularly in choosing our leaders, an over-emphasis on primordial definitions will potentially lead to a greater ethnic divide and unrepresentative leaders. Hence, we must liberalise our policies by removing any racial requirements for our leaders.

For example, there should not be any racial considerations in the choosing of our future PM. Several PAP members have alluded that Singapore is not ready for a non-Chinese PM (Yahoo News Singapore, 2021), despite overwhelming poll support for SM Tharman (who is Indian) to be PM (The Independent, 2019). This exclusion of non-Chinese PMs assumes irreconcilable differences between races, a sentiment that late Mr Lee Kuan Yew has directly vocalised (Han, 2015). In fact, he had similarly dismissed S Dhanabalan from becoming the next PM because he believed Singapore was not ready for an Indian PM (Tan, n.d.). However, the popularity of SM Tharman implies that such racial distinctions no longer carry as much weight, and these racial restrictions should be removed to reduce ethnic tensions and inequality.

In a similar vein, I argue that the racial provision for Singapore’s elected presidency is counterproductive and should be rescinded. President Halimah Yacob was the only eligible Malay candidate in the running, leading to a walkover election (The Straits Times, 2017). As implied by Zainudin Nordin, racial quotas may leave the public unconvinced that she would have won by meritocracy alone, leading to a potential loss of respect and legitimacy for both the President and the Malay community (Nordin, 2012). Additionally, such a racial provision may reinforce ethnic identities, which would impede Singapore’s progress towards a “colour-blind” society.

Both examples illuminate the need to liberalise our conceptions of race and religion and further democratise the selection of our leaders by removing racial barriers and provisions.

iii) Minority Representation

With a removal of such racial provisions, some may fear the loss of minority representation. While I do not deny the existence of racial voting (TODAY, 2017), I believe that ethnic minorities will continue to be represented.

Crucially, I believe that racial voting is not a significant factor. Currently, we have six racial minorities – SM Tharman, K. Shanmugam, Masagos Zulkifli, Vivian Balakrishnan, S. Iswaran, and Pritam Singh – who led their Group Representation Constituencies and were elected into Parliament. Evidently, racial minorities can and have overcome primordial racial pulls.

Additionally, I believe that the number of minority leaders is of less importance than the quality of these leaders. Dictating the race of our leaders could become tokenistic and unrepresentative, with mere ethnic diversity on the surface but no real intellectual diversity. Hence, the criteria for choosing our leaders should be how well they serve Singapore, which includes considering the views of minorities. For example, PM Lee has implied a likely approval for Muslim nurses to wear their tudung at work, a clear sign that the interests of minorities are being addressed (CNA, 2021).

Instead of focusing on primordial differences, our attention should shift to our shared Singaporean identity. While PM Lee has declared that having a minority leader is important for minorities to see that someone like them can lead the country (TODAY, 2017), every leader is already “someone like them” – a Singaporean. With a common identity and a shared vision, I believe that Singapore can “withstand the pulls of older racial [and religious] loyalties” (Tamney, 1988).

iv) Ultimate stance on primordial differences

Policies born from primordial differences allow Singapore to effectively categorise and mix people of different races and religions. This mixing can help citizens understand each other better, overcome our ethnic loyalties and realise our shared identity as Singaporeans (Ooi et al., 1993). However, beyond this role of socialising, such primordial differences should be abandoned. In the selection of our leaders, Singapore has come far enough to abolish racial provisions and restrictions to allow for the most deserving leader to serve the nation.

Government’s Over-aggression Towards Racial and Religious Issues

Another sphere in which Singapore could be more liberal is removing the government’s forceful crackdowns for racial and religious issues. The survival ideology has ceded the government too great a justification for its draconian laws to preserve the “fragile ethnoreligious fabric” of Singapore (Chen & Evers, 1978; Kuah-Pearce, 2009). For example, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), the Sedition Act, and the Internal Security Act (ISA) has been justified in preventing feelings of enmity between different ethnicities and preventing communal politics under the guise of religion (Tong, 2007). Given Singapore’s diversity of races and religions and the global trend towards ethnoreligious revivalism, it is no wonder that political leaders in Singapore are concerned about religiously motivated extremist attacks (Abdullah, 2017; Tan, 2007). The state constantly warns its citizens that without their firm control, anarchy and violence will follow (Hill, 1998). However, I argue that these laws may unduly create a climate of fear, leading to a lack of racial and religious discourse needed for the maturation of the public.

Firstly, the Out-of-Bounds (OB) markers are too restrictive, transforming racial and religious discourse into a taboo. For example, in 1987, Vincent Cheng was imprisoned under the Internal Security Act for using a Christian theory to express dissent against the government (ICJ, 1987). This shutdown on dissent on the premise of its religious undertones is largely unjustified – after all, religion is still a part of one’s identity and affects how we view the government and its policies. Instead of sentencing the dissenter, the government could have done better by engaging with the public and addressing their concerns.

Secondly, the OB markers are too vague, leading to overt self-censorship. The MRHA is very broadly defined[3], meaning that any political discourse overlaid with a religious tone could possibly be criminalised (Roach, 2006). Furthermore, the proceedings and considerations of the Council are secret (MRHA, 1990), meaning that the exact point where OB markers have been crossed is unknown to citizens (Tey, 2008). Without knowing where the boundary lies, citizens may choose to err on the side of caution and overly self-censor.

Lastly, these laws permit severe and largely unchecked punishments, which further exacerbate the climate of fear. Under the MRHA, little can prevent a restraining order. A judicial review order cannot be called, and only the President can challenge the Minister’s decision (MRHA, 1990). Under the ISA, detention can even be granted without trial (ISA, 1960), as in the Vincent Cheng example above. Hence, these laws give the executive arm virtually unchecked powers to deliver harsh punishments, further intimidating the public to avoid potentially sensitive discourse.

These three characteristics of the draconian laws lead to an avoidance of racial and religious discourse, creating a false perception of “ethnic tolerance”. Just as the number of white supremacists only came to light during the rise of Mr Donald Trump (LA Times, 2016; TIME, 2018), discriminatory views of Singaporeans could hide beneath the surface, insidiously affecting how we view one another. Hence, these policies need to be revised or removed to encourage open discussion of race and religion, allowing Singaporeans to think critically about the stereotypes they may have. As Alfian Sa’at aptly quipped, “there can be no process of maturation if [the population is] not first exposed to difficult ideas that lead to an examination of the self and its values” (IPS, 2018). For Singapore to truly become multicultural, it is time to abolish some of our draconian laws.

Conclusion

Given our diversity and geopolitical context, Singapore is indeed a potential breeding ground for racial and religious tensions. However, the mixing of communities aside, I believe that we have progressed beyond an overtly paternalistic approach to race and religion. Hence, a shift to focus on our shared experiences, culture, and language is vital in abolishing racial provisions and restrictions for leaders and removing draconian laws that suppress critical discourse. In essence, we need to evolve as a society to go beyond tolerance to appreciate our differences. Our different races and religions can then cease as fault lines and instead form the foundation for our Singapore story.

[1] We can manage the differences between ethnic groups. [2] We celebrate the differences between ethnic groups. [3] For example, attempting to cause feelings of enmity between different religious groups warrants a restraining order (MRHA, 1990).

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