Redefining Racism: The Rise of Right-wing Populism in New Zealand

Rebecca SE Tan

20/11/2023

Introduction

The recent New Zealand election on 14 October has caused quite a stir: after two terms of leadership under the center-left Labour Party, a growing populist movement will likely see the country shifting towards the center-right National Party (Reuters, 2023). Significantly, the main point of contention revolves around Māori programs designed to counter systemic challenges faced by the Māori and to acknowledge them as New Zealand’s first people. Discourses surrounding these provisions have begun to flip the conventional meaning of “racism” – from being unfair to indigenous people to being unfair to non-Māori. This essay hopes to track and analyse this change by investigating relevant landmark periods in New Zealand's history, particularly in its switch to a more neoliberal lens.

To understand the growing divide within New Zealand, one has to revisit the historical Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 between the Māori chiefs and the British Crown. This agreement accorded citizenship rights to the Māori and promised them protection of land and other resources. The affair was a grand ritual: a structured performance embodying a profound capacity to create and manipulate meaning, up till the present time (Kustermans et al., 2021; Rappaport, 1999).

Notably, the treaty reconciled an important contradiction: while the Māori chiefs signed it in good faith of the personal relationship they had with the British, this was in direct opposition to the impersonal nature of the Crown and the resultant law that was passed down. Undoubtedly deliberate, the British took great lengths to adhere to the customary procedures of Māori and to align with Māori’s spiritual view that signing the treaty would make them “equals under God” (Colenso, 1984; Orange, 2013, pp.45). They also framed the treaty as a fortress for Māori against potential French Pākehā (meaning ‘foreigners’), ironically at the expense of being under the control of the British Pākehā (Carleton, 1877). Finally, they adorned the event with a great show of ‘providence’ – from splendour, food, and gifts, to even a Royal salute of twenty-one guns (Colenso, 1984; RCMHD, 2005). Through this elaborate performance, the British downplayed the transfer of power to the Crown, masking the Treaty as a personal act of the Queen’s love towards the Māori.

Following the treaty, however, the document was often used by the colonial power to assert supremacy (Keenan, 2002), overstepping the agreed boundaries of kāwanatanga (translation: authority in an abstract sense. They eroded the tino rangatiratanga (translation: chieftainship) that was promised to Māori, leading to the loss of up to 95% of their land and resources (Mutu, 2019), military conflicts, and a gradual breakdown of tribal structures (Waitangi Tribunal, 2022).

Since then, however, reparations have slowly been made over time, such as the Crown spending millions in financial redress and returning numerous cultural sites and land (Corlett, 2022). Further, many provisions were also established to return rangatiratanga to Māori, such as the Māori Parliament in 1867 and the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, which helps to process claims of treaty breaches. In recent times, there have also been active reforms by the Labour Party, such as the creation of Māori wards within local councils and the push for greater Māori representation in regional advisory groups (Smith, 2023).

Yet, these efforts are insufficient to rectify the longstanding inequalities. Today, across all indicators of education level, income level and unemployment rates, Māori consistently perform lower than all other ethnic groups (Fig. 1). Māori also tend to live in overcrowded houses, work in manual jobs, have poorer health, higher mortality rates and higher prison incarceration (TEARA, 2013).

Rate of unemployment (%)	Median Income	Bachelor’s degree or higher qualifications

Figure 1. Comparison of Māori vs non-Māori in employment, income, and education in 2021 (MoBIE, n.d.).

More importantly, however, is that the Treaty earmarked a giant transformation into a new frame of reference: where Māori affairs became subsumed under the lens of Western liberalism. Indeed, long after Queen Victoria had passed, the impersonal nature of the law still ensnares the Māori in the legal system we understand today. From Tribunals to Parliaments and electoral voting, these avenues simultaneously provide an avenue to fight for greater rights while trapping Māori in a system of justification (Åsa Boholm, 1996). Today, for example, the Māori are questioned why they should have ‘preferential treatment’ if they are only 20% of the population, when – if we argue on numbers alone – the Māori shared power with the Pākehā when the ratio was 80000:2000 in the 1840s (Smith, 2023).

Theoretical Point of Departure: Neoliberalist Classification of ‘Race’, not ‘Indigeneity’

So, why did tensions escalate again between the Māori and Pākehā? After all, there was a period of relative ‘harmony’ between 1985 and 2004, during which major political parties generally endorsed the concept of biculturalism[1] in government discourse and policies, such as funding social services aimed at addressing socioeconomic disparities of Māori. Following this, however, the National Party joined the ranks of the far-right ACT[2] party in reframing Māori-Pākehā relations in terms of ‘race’, rather than ‘indigeneity’ (Brash, 2004). This shift in terminology stripped Māori from their historic oppression, dispossession, and exclusion (Kenrick & Lewis, 2004), processes which underscore much of Māori’s current socioeconomic challenges (Walker, 1990/2004). Paradoxically then, the cultural traits that once distinguished and hence situated the historical Māori-Pākehā relationship are now decried as superficial characteristics that should not be the basis for ‘discriminatory treatment’ (affirmative action). “Needs not race” became the rallying cry of dissent, reversing the conventional meaning of ‘racism’ – from condemning discrimination against an ethnic minority to condemning the favouring of the minority over the majority. As such, the racist becomes the antiracist and vice versa.

The correlation between the switch in terms and the rise in neoliberalism is not coincidental. Neoliberalism does not gel well with collective structures (Bourdieu, 1998), and is unable to accommodate for ‘indigeneity’, a term unavoidably intertwined with some conception of social grouping. Race, by contrast, is understood more as an individual attribute, and can hence fit within the individualistic ideology of neoliberalism in ascribing these traits via bodily characteristics. Following this, one may evoke the ideal of meritocracy to provide legitimacy to outright criticism of indigenous rights, insofar as it is phrased instead as ‘racial privilege’. We see this neoliberalist critique most strongly in the lead-up to the 2005 and 2023 elections.

Case Study 1: 2005 Elections

Both the ACT and the National Party utilised racialised rhetoric in the lead-up to the 2005 elections. ACT advocated that their neoliberal policies would provide sufficient economic opportunities for Māori to take advantage of and that there was no need for ‘racist’ tax expenditure to provide special assistance to them (Barber, 2008). The National Party also explicitly interpreted tino rangatiratanga (as before, ‘chieftainship’) granted to Māori to mean ‘self-reliance’ rather than ‘welfare dependency’ (Barber, 2008). Both parties criticised the Treaty of Waitangi for becoming a basis for granting more rights to Māori. Significantly, the National Party abandoned its slogan ‘One Standard of Citizenship’ for a more direct call to cease all ‘race-based government funding’.

Case Study 2: 2023 Elections

2023 sparked a new wave of ‘anti-racist’ sentiments, in the National Party, the ACT and the New Zealand First. National leader Christopher Luxon asserts that ‘New Zealand is one country’, emphasizing that public service should be based on individual needs rather than race. ACT leader David Seymour similarly criticises how “administration and service delivery has become focused on race” (Craymer, 2023). ACT also has extreme policy recommendations, pledging to reduce daily use of the Māori language and abolish the Māori Health Authority. They have even thrown an ultimatum into the coalition negotiations with the National Party to include a referendum to define the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Solomon, 2023). Importantly, the document simplifies the main Treaty principle to be that “discrimination based on ethnicity is illegal”, again attempting to disregard the vicissitudes of historical grievances in the name of equality[3]. Further, they started a petition to bring down co-governance so that “the colour of your skin” will no longer be more important than “the content of your character”.[4] Following this, Māori leaders wrote to politicians to caution against the increasingly explicit racist undertones (NZ Herald, 2023).

In both case studies, we see the pitfalls of affirmative action for Māori as the collective consciousness has come to disagree with governmental policies. The public is increasingly expecting the Māori to fit within the neat boxes of the current globalised political systems and work within the labour policies suited for modern job and ‘country’ needs, rather than being ‘handed’ opportunities on a silver spoon. This idea is perhaps most concisely presented in David Seymour's speech, “I think that, when people say Māori are disadvantaged, that does a disservice to non-Māori who face the same challenges. So, I don’t think we should be looking at disadvantage and categorising people according to race.” (Bhatia, 2023).

State as Practice: Rise of Right-wing Populism

This ‘racialised’ rhetoric is populist because it taps into the perceived grievances of the people, positioning them against an alleged elite or threat: Māori.

Indeed, the hard stances against Māori provisions are designed to resonate with more primal aspects of human nature, leveraging resentment against Māori on both ends of the class spectrum. On one end, claims made to the Treaty of Waitangi irks the wealthy resource developers, who seek to prevent Māori’s ‘privileged’ access to natural resources (Barber, 2008). On the other hand, targeted social spending for Māori upsets the working class, dissatisfied with Māori’s ‘privileged’ access to social services such as education, housing, and health (Barber, 2008). As such, the right-wing political parties ‘attribute’ a power of ‘privilege’ to Māori and reproduce this fictional reality to legitimise changing the state’s use of power in resource distribution.

Further, by defining Māori disadvantages to be individual shortcomings rather than systemic ones, Māori became scapegoated as a ‘threat’ to the country and an impediment to the nation’s progress (Johansson, 2004). For example, Lee Short, co-founder of Democracy Action, criticises the recent move towards greater power-sharing because it has caused cracks within a previously unified society (Smith, 2023). Seymour similarly deplores that the government’s actions risk “abandoning liberal democracy at the altar of the treaty”. As such, the racialised narrative concocts a threat towards the greatest fantasy of all: the need to create and maintain a harmonious domestic population.

What would prompt this made-up threat? Populism was surely being used to build a support base and secure votes. In 2004, the National Party’s internal polling showed that “race relations” was a “sensitive issue for voters” and the “most likely to sway their party allegiances” (Berry, 2004). With their strategy change, the Party increased their 2002 vote by 18% and its parliamentary seats by 22. It came to a final 49 seats, leading Labour and coming so close to forming a new coalition government[5] (Johansson, 2004). Their increase in support was clear – in a following opinion poll of 642 non-Māori New Zealanders, 75% supported the National Party’s “proposal to remove racial distinctions from Government services”, despite largely being unable to articulate which areas these racial distinctions occurred in (NZ Herald, 2004b). On the same day, a survey of 150 people explained that the money given to Māori was not well used and that all they do with it is “piss it up the wall” (NZ Herald, 2004a). Most felt opposed to special treatment for Māori simply on principle.

Similarly, the same tactic worked in the most recent 2023 elections, with the National Party winning the largest share of seats (Fig. 2).

National Party	ACT	New Zealand First	Labour	Green	Te Pati Māori
48	11	8	34	15	6

Figure 2. Seats won in 2023.[6]

Analysing multiple Reddit threads on the issue of Race and Māori/ non-Māori relations today,[7] a common theme is that the Māori are not as badly treated as indigenous communities in other countries, particularly in comparison to next-door neighbour Australia’s aborigines, or that nobody in the country dares to speak badly against Māori. While written in a positive light, these responses seem to presuppose a kind of “second-class” citizenry, to be compared to other indigenous people, rather than to the Pākehā citizens in New Zealand. Further, not daring to speak up against Māori, such as because they have “some of the biggest gangs”, doesn’t imply the absence of grievances against Māori, but rather simply its suppression. We hence see the same resistance towards Māori being provided with social provisions.

Significance, Limitations and Conclusion

Still, it would be prudent not to immediately dismiss these sentiments, even if they are populist in nature. After all, populism plays a dual role in corrupting and yet also renewing the democratic order (Arditi, 2003). Indeed, the racial rhetoric has actually brought up valid concerns about Māori provisions and state distribution of resources, which is better discussed openly rather than being left to bubble beneath the surface. Perhaps not by intention, but the 2004 messaging has since sparked a long overdue national debate on the Treaty of Waitangi and may signpost a healthier democracy in New Zealand compared to other countries like Singapore or America where race is considered taboo and self-censored in public discourse (Johansson, 2004).

The problem, however, is that these discourses are often exaggerated, leading to an erosion of minority rights, and even bordering on racism that would spell trouble for democracy. For example, Māori are often falsely scapegoated for the state of New Zealand’s economic affairs. Luxon says, “A vote for Labour, Greens or Te Pāti Māori, is a vote for a coalition of chaos with more economic mismanagement", because of these parties’ Māori-supporting policies (1News, 2023). Yet, the reasons for economic grievances in 2004 are more likely to stem from the restructuring of the New Zealand economy in the 1990s to improve the competitiveness in the global economy (Evans et al., 1996). In recent times as well, the Covid-19 pandemic and global downturn were likely a bigger factor than the Labour Party’s mishandling and ‘preferential treatment’ of Māori (Regan & Taylor, 2023).

Indeed, it is a scary trend that economic insecurities tend to correlate with right-wing populism and racial anxieties (Rebechi & Rohde, 2022). During economic stress, the population becomes more receptive to simplistic messaging that deflects away from true issues and instead projects them onto vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities and welfare beneficiaries, of which Māori are both (Barber, 2008). As such, the demonisation of a specific cultural group does not address a genuine problem, but rather a sacrificial lamb to account for the excesses of ‘progressive modernity’ and neoliberal capitalism. The population may hence become increasingly polarised into a ‘valorized’ majority and a demonised minority (Mazzarella, 2019), and be tempted to bypass institutions and processes for an emotional expression of popular rule (Canovan, 1999). As such, minority rights must be shielded to prevent the tyranny of the majority in New Zealand.

Moving forward, it is important to manage the contention between the sovereignty of the people with the fact that they are unqualified (Rancière & Corcoran, 2014), and the balance between liberty and equality (Appadurai 2007). More educational efforts may bridge the gap between the Māori and non-Māori as they may better appreciate the rich cultural and historical context of their partnership, rather than focus on their difference in attributes such as ‘race’. In particular, political parties should hold closed-door dialogues with each other to discuss a vision forward. After all, if the end goal is indeed social cohesion and national harmony – as both sides would likely agree – then they must commit to deriving a future that would not only be built on a shaky, volatile foundation of antagonising emotions but rather one forged with the long-term in mind. As a past National Party leader quipped when he was urged to stir up racial sentiments, “Playing the race card may help us win – then come Monday how do we run the country?” (Bolger, 1998, pp.177).

This solution is surely idealistic as it requires a prudent balancing act. On the one hand, we must guard against emphasising cultural traits so distinctively that it leads to divisions and purity notions within the population (Tremewan, 2005). On the other hand, we must also avoid removing collective identities to the point that the predicament of social groupings is no longer situated within their historical heritage (Johansson, 2004). Lastly, we must also hold our politicians accountable by demonstrating a commitment to objective analysis, particularly in this era of post-truth and rage politics. If populism is so required, let it be pitted against an actual, narrow, and defined elite. Only through conscientious effort can we work out the right balance for populism, democracy, discourse, and society building.

Word Count: 2675

[1] Biculturalism: having different policies for Māori and non-Māori

[2] The ACT party was the first mover to reframe Māori policies as ‘race relations’ under the banner ‘End Government Racism’ (Prebble, 2003). However, the public narrative only shifted significantly after the National Party started to parrot these views.

[3] See proposed referendum: here

[4] See petition: here

[5] In order to form the government, a party or coalition with at least 61 seats is needed. In 2005, the Labour Party managed to form a coalition government despite winning one seat less than the National Party. This was because the National Party was unable to gain the support of the Māori Party to form the government, and, seeing this, later toned down on their racial rhetoric.

[6] The three parties on the left use the racial rhetoric more, while those on the right are more pro-Māori provisions.

[7] Restricted only to the last year of responses.

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