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The Definitional Problem: Can States be Terrorists?

Rebecca SE Tan

13 January 2023


Introduction

“Remember the worst terrorist campaign in the world by far is the one that’s being orchestrated in Washington. That’s the global assassination campaign. There’s never been a terrorist campaign of that scale” (Euronews, 2019). In this provocative statement, Noam Chomsky labelled the United States (US) as a terrorist actor – and he’s not alone. Other scholars such as Alexander George have made the same claim that the United States “are the major supporters, sponsors, and perpetrators of terrorist incidents in the world today” (George, 1991, pp.1). The significance of labels cannot be understated, and calls into question an important definitional debate surrounding terrorism: is it about the act or the actor? In this essay, I argue that countries can and should indeed be labelled terrorists – United States included – exemplified by various direct and indirect acts. Since states often use their power to influence narratives, I argue that using the same moral critique for a state’s behaviour can knock them off their presupposed moral high ground, and hold them accountable for their atrocities, in turn reducing the fuel for more radicalism in places where states may have over-projected their influence.


So, how can we define state terrorism? Proponents argue that state terrorism is indeed terrorism because it is about the act, not the actor – hence also holding into account governments and quasi-governmental agencies. These agencies may officially support violence and intimidation, such as through providing for paramilitary groups, or via more covert means, which will be explored in the Latin American case later. For this essay, I will be using Blakeley’s definition of state terrorism, which entails the following four elements: (a) the violence is deliberate and directed towards individuals who should be under the protection of the state; (b) the state is orchestrating or in conjunction with the actors; (c) the purpose of the violence includes creating extreme fear in their observers; and (d) the act is intended to force the audience to modify their behaviour (Blakeley, 2009, pp.15). As seen in this definition, (c) and (d) show the strong similarity between dissident and state terrorism – for which the goals go beyond simply punishing (as in other labels such as genocide) to that of fear and change in behaviour (Silke, 2019).


Examples of State Terrorism

The US is one such nation that employs state terrorism – both directly and indirectly. One direct involvement is their stance towards Cuba after Fidel Castro overthrew pro-American dictator Fulgencio Batista (Pollard, 1982). When the Bay of Pigs invasion failed in 1961, the US had not stopped there – The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) actively helped Cuban counterrevolutionaries based in the US, which led to a huge impact on Cuba’s civilian population (Bolender, 2010). These attacks went on for over thirty years, amplified by a crushing embargo, which is still in place today (Chomsky, 2014a). The economic impact of these sanctions is estimated to have cost Cuba over $750 billion (Lamrani, 2013). Further, beyond the decreased economic and social well-being of the Cuban people, this conflict could also have potentially caused a nuclear fallout (the Cuban Missile Crisis) (Chomsky, 2014a). Analysts suggest that the US campaign was one of the significant factors which triggered then-Premier Nikita Khrushchev to place missiles in Cuba, in preparation against what looked to be an incoming American invasion (NSA, 2022).


State terrorism can also come in a more indirect or covert way. The US has similarly employed this tactic before when Washington contributed to the state terrorism in Latin America, where the local state employed killings, abductions, torture, and military dictatorships. This backing by the US to quash the leftist rebellion was heavily due to their fear of communism spreading – believing that a fall of one state to communism would trigger many such revolutions elsewhere. One example is Operation Condor in Chile. Under the Pinochet dictatorship, dissident and rebel groups were repressed, with more than three thousand people dying or disappearing in transnational political violence. These governmental efforts were backed by the CIA in the United States, including a specialised School of the Americas to train about 60,000 officers and cadets in counterinsurgency methods (Grimmett, n.d.). The training manuals include references to torture, censorship, false arrest, and extortion, and frighteningly do not distinguish between armed and unarmed civilians (Haugaard, 1997).


Clearly, such instances of state terrorism aren’t unique to America - in 2018, a Saudi journalist and an ex-Russian spy were murdered by their governmental agents (Hewitt, 2018). Australia backed Indonesia when it repressed the people of East Timor (Chomsky, 2000, pp. 51-61), while British forces tortured suspected Republican terrorists (Conroy, 2001, pp. 5-11), and tacitly supported acts of Loyalist violence in Northern Ireland (Blakeley, 2007). Indeed, state terrorism tops the list of most fatalities in Great Britain from terrorism, during the period from 1968 to 2018 (Silke, 2019). The vilest of offences – extraordinary rendition – was found in 54 foreign governments post-9/11 attacks (OPJI, 2013).



Significance of the Label

Given the evidence of such instances, why is it important to label state terrorism as it is? Labels like terrorism are powerful, as they unveil a moral argument that has normative implications on how a state behaves. Think, for example, of how the US, worried about Communist links, labelled Nelson Mandela as a terrorist, justifying their “defense” against the African National Congress. Indeed, many states today use various factors to justify their radical actions – but their reactions also need to be held accountable. One example is the French’s use of torture against the Algerian population (Vidal-Naquet, 1963), justified as a necessity to obtain intelligence about potential threats (Blakeley, 2007). As a side effect, be it intended or otherwise, this violence was also instrumental in undermining the morale of the Algerian insurgents (Blakeley, 2007). The label of state terrorism hence calls out countries for their seeming hypocrisy in moral standards.


Terrorism begets terrorism begets terrorism. The irony, or perhaps unironically, is that state terrorism is often justified as “counterterrorism”. The US’s “war on terror” campaign could also be seen as a way for the US to deal with the backlash it has received for its involvement in Central America and South Africa (Tehran Times, 2021). By labelling state terrorism as it is, the same moral argument can be recycled to critique countries for their own repression and violent acts, in response to what they have labelled immoral. In other words: to pick out the log in one’s eye before dealing with the speck in another’s eye.


With the label of state terrorism, states should become more conscious of their actions, in order not to fuel further radicalism. Indeed, state terrorism, often justified as a response to terrorism, has actually fuelled greater resentment. One example is the US’s strikes in Syria, which has been classed by jihadi organisations such as the Islamic State as an “attack against Islam”, in order to boost support and recruitment rates (Chomsky, 2014b). CIA analyst Graham Fuller even goes so far as to assert that the US’s interventions in the Middle East and Iraq were the founding reasons for the birth of the Islamic State (Mustafa, 2015). Failed assassinations that miss their mark and kill unintended civilians – such as the allegedly CIA-sponsored 1985 car bombing of a Hezbollah target Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah – can also rile up civilian discontent as fuel for radicalism (Thrall, 2007).


Importantly, the definition of state terrorism needs to hold everyone to the same moral standard, instead of morality being dictated by the powerful. A clear example of this is the removal of Iraq’s terrorist status in 1982, such that the Raegan administration could provide Saddam Hussein with aid after he invaded Iran (Chomsky, 2016). This flip-flop in labelling to suit one’s own interests should not be allowed if the same standard is to be defined and applied to all states. Further, labelling state terrorism will also re-centralise the idea of “terrorism”, which has often been misappropriated by mainstream media and politics as a critique against atrocities targeting the West (George, 1991). Indeed, state terrorism does not only refer to non-Western states, or that of authoritarian states – as Blakeley says, “Because terrorism is a tactic and not an ideology, states of any kind can be perpetrators of terrorism.” (Blakeley, 2007, pp. 234). Indeed, terrorist acts “have been committed by states which are rich and poor, revolutionary and reactionary, expansionist and reclusive, secular and religious, east and west, north and south.” (Stohl, 2006, pp. 5). For example, French secret agents bombed a Greenpeace ship in 1985, ahead of its planned protests against nuclear testing (Greenpeace, n.d.). Similarly, Israel has also targeted scientists in Iran’s nuclear programme (Hewitt, 2018). Hence, all governments need to consider any politically motivated acts of violence with the intention to instil fear as terrorism – even, or perhaps especially their own, so that they can reflect on their own actions and see that they are not beyond reproach.



But… isn’t State Violence Legitimate?

Opponents would argue that, by definition, the state has a monopoly of power and hence embodies the only legitimate use of violence (Laqueur, 2003). Hence, terrorism can only be perpetrated by “a subnational group or non-state entity” (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 40). However, while some state violence may indeed be legitimate, it might not always be – particularly when it comes to grievous breaches of human rights for the very specific purpose of inducing fear. Political theorist Hannah Arendt saw terror as the essence of totalitarian governments and ideologies, fabricating mankind to eliminate “parts” to protect the “whole” (Arendt, 1953, pp. 311). Can we then excuse the Nazi or Stalin or Hussein’s regime? Beyond the more obvious and blatant violence in totalitarianism, we must also stay vigilant against narratives by the state that seems to justify their overly aggressive actions. One example is the propagandist approach that the US takes to de-legitimise actors who threaten its interests, such as by labelling them “terrorists” (Chomsky, 1991, pp.12).



Don’t we have enough Labels?

Another criticism is that the label of state terrorism is unnecessary – with other conventions or national remedies already existing on issues such as war crimes (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 28). However, it is not just the need that such crimes need to be taken to justice, but rather that there is an underlying logic that underpins the actions as in dissident terrorism (Brown, 2021). After all, not all state violence is state terrorism. Using state terrorism as an analytical tool is useful to understand violent behaviour – think, for example, of examining the use of the atomic bombs in Japan – its intended political target being the survivors in Tokyo (Schelling, 2008, pp. 17). Here, the focus is not only on bringing the perpetrators to justice, but to understand their motivations and cause for such violence. Further, there are also cases in which the label “war crime” falls short, exemplified by how Hitler described his violence against Jews:

“I shall spread terror… these so-called atrocities save me hundreds of thousands of individual actions against the protestors and discontent… (who) will think twice to oppose me when he learns what is [awaiting] him in the [concentration] camp.” (Gurr, 1986, pp. 46).

Indeed, Hitler can be charged with genocide and crimes against humanity, but the label of terrorism more clearly distinguishes his action from the mere elimination of minorities – to dissect his intention to terrorize beyond the direct victim (Brown, 2021). As seen, terrorism is a label that can concisely encapsulate a more precise lens for analysis.



Conclusion

In conclusion, the United States – along with many other nations, are indeed participants of state terrorism. While some may argue on the legitimacy of the violence committed, or even argue that these acts belong under a separate label, I believe that the label of terrorism is an apt one, as it precisely dissects the use of violence for a political goal, specifically to induce fear in more than just the direct target. Further, and perhaps more importantly, using the term state terrorism can highlight the seeming hypocrisy in using overtly aggressive “counterterrorism” measures, which in itself may be considered terrorism itself – be it killings, extraordinary rendition, torture, invasion, etcetera. The expansion of terrorism to include states can hence set the same moral standards for states as we already do for dissidents (not just of authoritarian but also democratic states) and reveal afresh the atrocities that Western governments have similarly been committing, in contrast with underlying Western superiority, Orientalist or Islamophobic narratives in certain terrorism scholarship.



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