The ‘Evils’ of Religion: A Source of Political Violence and Terrorism?

Rebecca SE Tan

18 November 2022

Introduction

On the fateful day of September 11, 2001, al Qaeda hijacked four planes and crashed them, most notably into the twin towers of the World Trade Center (History, 2018). These attacks killed almost 3000 people and brought to the forefront the idea of “religious terrorism” (Healey, 2005). “Religious terrorism”, as defined by Gus Martin, is “terrorism motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned—and commanded—the application of terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith.” It is “usually conducted in defence of what believers consider to be the one true faith” (Martin, 2014, p.4). While it is indeed true that there are an increasing number of terrorist organisations characterised by religious motivations (OJP, 1997), this data needs to be analysed within a bigger perspective on the trends and causes of terrorism. By insisting on this tenuous linkage between religion and terrorism, I argue that we may fall into the trap of the powerful, with dire implications for the well-being of the marginalised, and our methods of combating terrorism.

Religion & Terrorism?

Since the 9/11 attacks, the term “religious terrorism” has gained traction. “New atheists” such as Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens argue that religion necessarily leads to absolutism, irrationality, and violence (Megoran, 2018). A mere four days after the attack, Dawkins writes in The Guardian: “To fill a world with religion, or religions of the Abrahamic kind, is like littering the streets with loaded guns. Do not be surprised if they are used” (Shaw, 2001). What are the reasons for such a hard stance?

One major argument is that religion incites “fundamental changes in the existing order”, rather than “[instigating] the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good” (Hoffman, 1998). For example, proponents may argue that religions have inherent violent tendencies because it seeks to transform the “social existence of the world” and is aimed at the destruction of society (Laqueur, 1999; Weber, 1920/1999). This distinction, however, is more of one between reformism and revolution, rather than religion and secularism (Sedgwick, 2004). For example, while Islam generally does not embrace the formal separation of church and state, the inability of politics and religion to be de-linked is only promoted by some opportunistic terrorist groups – with the interpretation and hence implication on behaviour not necessarily accepted by Islam scholars (Bar, 2004). Further, non-religious groups have had similarly maximalist objectives, such as the right-wing terrorist group “The Base”, which asserts that societal collapse is both imminent and necessary (ADL, 2020).

Another argument is that religious terrorists are less restrictive in the use of violence because they view it to be morally justified by a supernatural authority (Stern, 2004). More extreme means are possible because perpetrators “feel engaged in a Manichaean struggle of good against evil” (Cronin, 2002, p.41), and strives to obliterate “broadly defined categories” (Hoffman, 1998, p.15). Sam Harris, for example, argues this about 9/11: “Why did nineteen well-educated, middle-class men trade their lives in this world for the privilege of killing thousands…? Because they believed that they would go straight to paradise for doing so. It is rare to find the behaviour of human beings so fully and satisfactorily explained” (Harris, 2006, pp. 29). Yet, this claim of good versus evil or that of broadly defined enemies does not only apply to religious terrorism, but radicalism in general. Take, for example, Émile Henry – a 19th-century anarchist who bombed a café because “there are no innocent bourgeois" (Shaya, 2010). In fact, the terrorist group with the most suicide attacks is actually the Tamil Tigers, based more on Marxist or Leninist elements than religion (Iannaccone & Berman, 2006; Pape, 2003). Moreover, religious terrorists are not the only ones who perceive themselves to be “unconstrained by secular values or laws” (Cronin, 2002, pp.41). Atheists similarly develop moral foundations and may even express more dogmatism (a lack of openness in beliefs) and prejudice to defend their values (Kossowska et al., 2016; Simpson & Rios, 2017; Uzarevic et al., 2017). We can find similarities in the anarchist wave (such as Malatesta) and the left-wing wave of terrorism, where terrorists viewed themselves as vanguards, justifying their violence to develop their vision of a better world (Sedgwick, 2004).

Still, proponents of “religious terrorism” rightly point to a long history of politico-religious violence, such as the Thugs, the Assassins, and the Zealots (Rapoport, 1983). For example, the Thugs offered the blood of strangled travellers to Kali, believing that they were helping to maintain the balance of the universe (Rapoport, 1983). Undeniably, it is true that many terrorist organisations do have religion as a major component (Fig. 1) (Jones et al., 2020). However, by zooming in on only one side of the argument, we risk missing an analysis through the broader lens of terrorism causes and trends. The bigger picture shows no clear links between religion and violence, other significant causes of terrorism, and the rationality behind terrorist acts.

Figure 1. Percentage of terrorist attacks by perpetrator orientation in the United States, of which only 15% are by religious terrorists (Jones et al., 2020).

Larger Trends

i. No Clear Links Between Religion and Violence

Research has shown that a high level of religious devotion is a poor predictor of violence or support of terrorist organisations (Hardy et al., 2012; Wright & Khoo, 2019). In fact, greater involvement in religious activities may actually promote peace (Nepstad, 2004), reduce aggressive behaviour (Huesmann et al., 2011; Shepperd et al., 2015), and decrease crime rates (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012). We perhaps already anecdotally understand that religion need not necessarily lead to violence – think, for example, of some of history’s best: Martin Luther King Jr. (The Nobel Prize, n.d.), Archbishop Desmond Tutu (The Elders, n.d.), the Dalai Lama (The Nobel Prize, n.d.-b), and Mohandas Gandhi (History, 2010). Each of these leaders was strongly influenced by religion, utilising concepts such as peaceful resistance or denouncing oppression to fight for human rights (Saperstein, 2013). On the other hand, we also understand that staunch atheists are equally capable of terror. A quick walk down history lane reminds us of Mao Zedong and Pol Pot. If you find these anecdotal pieces of evidence insufficient, I wholly agree. Yet these are exactly the kind of arguments proponents of “religious terrorism” use. Indeed, while instances of secular motivations far outweigh that of religious ones, they receive less attention than “the loss of life for religious ideals” (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015, pp. 151).

Figure 2. The number of terrorist attacks in relation to their ideologies (IEP, 2022).

Further, terrorist organisations – religious or secular – are opportunistic. Secular terrorism may just as well utilise “religious” elements for its causes. A Russian anarchist perceived terrorism as “uniting… the martyr and the hero”, while nationalists or leftists may assert that their cause of independence or freedom from oppression is sacred (Sedgwick, 2004). Hence, just as Bin Laden misrepresented the concept of jihad for his purposes in 1998 (FAS, n.d.), secular forces can equally use this tactic – a nationalist may misrepresent patriotism, while a leftist can instigate violence for class justice (Sedgwick, 2004). Perhaps then, it is not religion, but simply its role in binding communities that has facilitated the impression of religious terrorism (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000). Another suggestion is that it is rather the perceived suppression or threat of religion, that has worked to generate terrorism (Branscombe et al., 1999). It is not difficult to see how radicalised terrorists can harness religious oppression or resentment to their advantage, with their claims being not-so-ironically more appealing to those who are less knowledgeable about their religion (Wright & Khoo, 2019). In actuality, many terrorists had no religious upbringing; it was only by joining the organisations did they increase in religiosity (Bartlett & Miller, 2012).

i. Blinded from the Other Causes

Blanket labelling terrorist organisations as “religious terrorists” blinds us to other legitimate causes. Many terrorist organisations with links to religion actually focus mainly on national independence or autonomy, with religion being an important element of their national or ethnic identity (Juergensmeyer, 2010; Munson, 2005). Take, for example, the Catholic “nationalists” versus Protestant “loyalists” fighting over the independence of Northern Ireland (Roos, 2021). Or that of the Jewish Stern Gang, who worked in Palestine to establish the State of Israel (Brenner, 1965). Even for that of Hamas – where the liberation of Palestine and the creation of the Islamic state is overtly justified upon religious grounds and religious sites – it is difficult to markedly dissociate their emergence from other nationalist liberations (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). Clearly, we cannot detach terrorism from the long-term historical contexts or even recent triggers (Crenshaw, 1981). Can we really nullify the impact of say, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the United States’ occupation of Iraq, or Israel’s occupation in 1982? These interventions, particularly by major powers, have caused much resentment and have been shown to be a greater instigator of violence and radicalism than some fundamentalist character of religion (Gleditsch & Rudolfsen, 2016).

Other significant factors that are linked to political violence include (absolute or relative) socio-economic deprivation, psychological resource loss and experiences of external humiliation (Canetti et al., 2010; Jones, 2012; Zaidise et al., 2007). This includes feelings of unfairness or discrimination (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Muluk et al., 2012). Indeed, while much of the terrorism in the Middle East has been attributed to the predominance of Islam, studies show that it may be more because it is a war-torn area, has high levels of state repression, and embodies similar levels of political, economic, and cultural discrimination as non-religious conflicts elsewhere (Fox, 2001; Lia, 2004).

That is not to say that religion cannot be an important factor. For example, we cannot deny the influence of Islam on al Qaeda. It envisions a state ruled by its version of Islam, its target constituency are Muslims, and propagates religious concepts such as duty, self-discipline, devotion, and piety (Sedgwick, 2004). Yet, their immediate objectives remain political, as with any other terrorist group – including overthrowing regimes, ending occupation, and freeing Palestine (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). This contrast in objectives is not unheard of – think, for example, of Stalin. While his ultimate aim is fuelled by communist ideology, his immediate objectives, such as expanding Soviet territory to protect Russia, are undoubtedly political (Sedgwick, 2004).

ii. Terrorism as a Rational Choice

Beyond the other situational causes of terrorism, we also need to understand the rationality behind employing terroristic acts (Crenshaw, 1981). Proponents may denounce “religious terrorism” as irrational, mistakenly ignoring the decision-making process involved in employing this violent strategy (Juergensmeyer, 2017). For example, proponents believe that while “secular” terrorists endeavour to appeal to the public, “religious” terrorists appeal only to themselves and the “perceived commands of a deity” (Cronin, 2002, pp. 41; Hoffman, 1998, pp. 15). Is it really true that these leading terrorists – many of whom are from highly educated backgrounds – are illogical men running around to spread harm (Ghosh et al., 2016)? Definitely not – terrorism is a rational strategy and has been proven successful on various occasions (Pape, 2003). Take, for example, the attacks by Hezbollah, which compelled the United States (U.S.) and French military out of Lebanon in 1984 (Guitta, 2005). Or the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia that pressured Bill Clinton to pull U.S. troops out in 1994 (Bowden, 2019). Given these successes, it seems that a terrorist attack like that of 9/11 is a rational approach to achieving their political objectives. This rationality is fortunate, as it provides better predictability to formulate our counterterrorism strategies.

Implications of a “Religion Equals Violence” Discourse

The construction of the social reality of “religious terrorism” is highly dangerous (Jackson, 2007b). It enables the powerful to demonise their opponents, justifying harsher measures with disastrous consequences for civil liberties, especially for the marginalised, as well as our attempts in combatting terrorism.

i. The Religious Discourse: Weapon of the Powerful

“Religious terrorism” is a useful tool for the powerful in the West to define an oriental other (Aziz, 2009; Jackson, 2007b). Take, for example, the discourse around the term “jihad”. While western scholars have tended to associate jihad with the Holy War, the various interpretations of jihad do not actually present a clear link between Islam and political violence (Corbin, 2017). Yet, “religious terrorism” perpetuates orientalist assumptions and defines an opposition between the “Western friend” and the “Islamic Other” (Beydoun, 2016; Said, 1978/2019) – emphasising false binaries between good and bad, secular, and religious, peaceful, and violent, and civilised versus savage (Jackson, 2007b). As a result, terrorist groups with political origins are denigrated as mere irrational, religion-frenzy people (Fighel, 2009), with their motives effectively delinked from the consequences of Western policies (Jackson, 2007b). One example is the invasion of Iraq, justified as an attempt to prevent the demonised and fanatical religious terrorists from getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction (Denike, 2008; Jackson, 2008). Other projects by Britain and USA such as expanding into Central Asia, increasing military support in Africa, or controlling oil resources similarly allow the strong to justifiably breach national sovereignty (Jackson, 2007b).

ii. Justifies Harsher Measures

By assuming this irrationality and “cosmic aims” of violent groups, counterterrorism strategies have changed drastically, especially with regard to legitimising coercive responses (Jackson, 2007b). Discourse on terrorism has shifted from a “crime” into a “war”, favouring a security approach (based on force and repression) rather than a cosmopolitan one (based on diplomacy, negotiation, and the rule of law) – as already demonstrated in the Iraq invasion (Kurtulus, 2012). Another example is the delegitimising of any political engagement with Hamas, despite past instances of Hamas’ display of pragmatism (Gunning, 2010; Mishal & Sela, 2006). Indeed, by propagating the idea that religious terrorists are crazy and cannot be reasoned with, there exists a lack of exploration of alternative policies (Jackson, 2007b).

Such hard-line measures may include restricting civil liberties or committing serious human rights violations. Extra-judicial means and increased state power has become normalised, such as intrusive surveillance, expanded police power and the regulation of speech (Winkler, 2012). One example is the secret compilation of over 8000 al-Qaeda “sympathisers” by the British police (Kundnani, 2014). In some cases, suspects are even transferred to places such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib for investigations, as the fewer human rights restrictions in those countries allow the military to employ more sadistic interrogation methods, including sexual and religious humiliation (Gordon, 2006; Jackson, 2008). Further, these harsh measures may not necessarily be used exclusively for terrorists. Take, for example, the Internal Security Act in Singapore and Malaysia, which allows for detention without trial (Ng, 2021). While this act is justified upon the premise that the government can act swiftly in the case of security threats like terrorism, one cannot deny the possibility of it being misused for other political reasons (Cheong, 2006). Yet, despite the increasingly draconian legislation in many countries, the public has only grown more acceptant of them, in order to combat the perceived radical security threat (Greenberg, 2008; Jackson 2007a).

Alarmingly, these measures may be even more dangerous for the marginalised, due to the danger of being labelled as an “enemy”. Since 9/11, there has been more intensive stereotyping of, not just Muslims, but also Arabs or dark-skinned people with beards – which has had vast implications on harassment, hate crimes and workplace discrimination, even including the dis-identification of them as citizens (CAIR, 2007; Fears, 2002; Giardina, 2010; Jackson, 2007b; Volpp, 2007). Further, research has also found increasing islamophobia, with an increasing view of Muslims as “fanatical, violent and intolerant” (BBC, 2006; EUMC, 2005). Take, for example, the scrutiny of over 100,00 Muslim Americans under surveillance – most of whom are not “would-be terrorists” but rather “law-abiding citizens” (Kundnani, 2014). This unfair linkage of religion with terrorism can also come from very subtle, insidious othering. In one of Obama’s speeches, he mentions the responsibility of Muslim communities to “push back on [Al Qaeda’s and ISIL’s] twisted interpretations of [the Islam] faith” (OWH, 2015). While this speech did not explicitly link Islam with terrorism, it places the burden on Muslims to prove that they are “one of us” and “not one of them”. Saddeningly, plenty of minority Americans live in fear of being mistaken as a terrorist (Kundnani, 2014), despite actually being victims of terrorism as well. To put into perspective, this would be like making male rape victims prove that they are not rapists, just because there exists a number of male rapists – a ridiculous proposition.

iii. Wrong Cause, Wrong Solution

Locating the wrong source of the problem in religion also leads to dire implications for our counterterrorism strategies. Not only are these harsh measures inhumane, but they may also be highly ineffective in reducing terrorism. As in the case of the Easter Rising in Ireland, a military defeat may ironically lead the group to bounce back (Sedgwick, 2004). Indeed, it is paramount that counterterrorism strategies do not alienate the local population, as in the case of the US’s brutal invasion of Afghanistan. This marginalisation only benefits terrorist organisations in mobilising locals, with promises of a sense of purpose and belonging (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). Beyond merely the extreme of invasion, studies have also shown that securitising religious practices, profiling individuals on religious grounds and religious marginalisation create more resentment and undermine crucial community support for counterterrorism (AU, 2007; Lambert, 2013; Spalek & Lambert, 2008). In fact, in areas where religious activists, especially that of a popular movement, are imprisoned, tortured, or harassed, a self-fulfilling prophecy may be born when these activists decide that terrorism is their only way out (Esposito, 1994). Compare, for example, the different responses of Muslims in Algeria versus Malaysia, as an illustration of the role of repression. We must hence avoid dismissing the rationality behind terrorism, so we do not inadvertently fuel more radicalism.

Conclusion

The idea of “religious terrorism” seems to conflate concepts of radicalism and revolution with some fundamentalist character of religion. Many of the arguments that portray religious terrorism as an irrational, distinct form of terrorism ignore crucial aspects of the reasoning behind religion-linked terrorist groups, while selectively ignoring dogmatic aspects of “secular” terrorism. While religion can most definitely be a significant enabler of terrorism, it is imperative that we view them to be just as rational as other groups defined by ethnicity, ideology, or other markers. Only by removing our bias of vilifying religious-linked groups can we halt the justification of coercive and inhuman measures, including the giving up of our own civil liberties, and deliberate on alternative policies to deal with the root problems of radicalism.

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