Are Democracies Greater Predisposed to Terrorism?

Rebecca SE Tan 11 October 2022

Spurred by my lecture on the causes of terrorism today, I want to explore the argument that democracies may be an enabler of terrorism. If this argument is valid, there are potentially significant implications – at least as a word of caution on the side effects of strengthening political rights.

Perhaps one of the earlier works on this argument is “The Causes of Terrorism” by Martha Crenshaw in 1981. In this influential piece, she delineates three levels of causation – situation, strategy, and individual participation. Democracies, in particular, can be seen as the “situation” or “permissive factor” that brewed the conditions for terrorism. Interestingly, she emphasises the role of a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism. While this also includes incompetent authoritarian states (such as that of tsarist Russia in dealing with Narodnaya Volya), she highlights liberal democratic states “whose desire to protect civil liberties constrains security measures”. She further points out that terrorism does not occur in communist dictatorships or repressive military regimes, such as those in Uruguay, Brazil, or Argentina.

In another influential scholarship by Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” (2003), this reasoning is further explored through a specific focus on suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism can be considered an even more extreme form of terrorism (at least in methodology), as there are much higher stakes involved. Through the paper, he notes that every suicide terrorist campaign (since the 1980s) has been targeted against democracies, implying that terrorists perceive democracies as suitable targets. Vice versa, nationalist movements who face nondemocratic opponents have not resorted to suicide attacks. What could be the explanation for such a phenomenon? Pape suggests two reasons – first, democracies are viewed as “soft”. Exactly because they are greater held accountable to the people, terrorism may have a stronger ability to affect state policy through the decry of the public. Secondly, for the large part and at least since World War II, democracies have been more restrained in using force against civilians. Since terrorists know that the state has a great capacity to retaliate with extreme punishment, they need to rely on the fact that their opponent will at least be somewhat restrained.

*There are also other reasons suggested by multiple scholars (summarised in this 2012 paper): e.g. democratic systems make it easier for terrorists to plan and coordinate because of their freedoms; or the inherent competitiveness within democracies incentivises the use of force to get ahead; or that the processes in democracies make it easier to form a gridlock and get nothing done; or simply that the press freedom in democracies mean more of these attacks are reported (with extensive media coverage further advancing the goals of terrorists).

“But wait!” You may say. “Shouldn’t democracies have lower terrorism rates because actors can air their grievances through legal means rather than violent ones?”

Indeed, the ideal case is for people in democracies to choose the ballot over the bullet. Yet, empirical evidence again suggests otherwise. Take, for example, the IRA in Britain, the ETA in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, or the Shining Path in Peru. Despite having democratic options available, these groups chose the path of violence instead.

Still – as you can see from the scholarship’s dates (1981 & 2003) – the arguments above lay on quite outdated data. While a more recent data compilation (2010) still seems to suggest a similar greater occurrence in democracies than autocracies, it emphasises the growth of terrorism in anocracies (Figure 1). Another academic paper in 2006 suggests that it is actually those within the medium spectrum of political freedoms that are more susceptible to terrorism (Figure 2). This stance is corroborated by another article exploring the period from 2002-2019. Still others assert that established democracies are less likely to experience terrorist attacks, though newly formed or transitioning democracies are particularly susceptible (2013 & 2020).

*Note: the definitions of terrorism or democracies may also vary between papers, making it additionally difficult to draw a conclusive statement.

Figure 1: Correlation of Regime Type with Terrorist Incidents from 1990 to 2010

Figure 2. Correlation of the lack of political rights with the risk of terrorist attacks

Whichever the case, though, I think it is important to note that the “situation” alone is far from able to encapsulate the reasons for terrorism. Going back to Crenshaw’s argument, there are indeed multiple layers to the causes. The situation includes various factors such as the preconditions (e.g. long term inequality/ oppression/ grievances etc), the trigger (e.g. Bloody Sunday and the resulting recruitment into the IRA) and other permissive factors (e.g. urbanisation/ modernisation etc). Beyond that, terrorists need to determine that terrorism is an effective (and necessary) strategy to effect change or get their point across. Lastly, some amount of individual agency/ participation is required for people to ultimately join terrorist groups.

What about you? Do you think a country’s regime type is a significant cause/ factor for terrorism? Let me know in the comments below!